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Securing the critical infrastructure of the United States is of utmost importance in
ensuring the security of the nation. To secure this complex system a structured
approach such as the NIST Cybersecurity framework is used, but systems are only
as secure as the sum of their parts. Understanding the capabilities of the individual
devices that make up the system, developing tools to help detect misoperations, and
providing forensic evidence for incidence response are all essential to mitigating risk.
This thesis examines the SEL-3505 Real Time Automation Controller to demonstrate
the importance of existing security capabilities as well as creating new processes and
tools to support the National Institute of Standards Cybersecurity Framework of
Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.
The research examines the potential pitfalls of having small-form factor devices
in poorly secured and geographically disparate locations. Additionally, the research
builds a data-collection framework to provide a proof of concept anomaly detection
system for detecting network intrusions by recognizing the change in task time dis-
tribution. This framework uses Python to collect data from a modbus server on the
target device and perform statistical tests to distinguish between normal and anoma-
lous behaviour. The high true positive rates and low false positive rates show the
merit of such an anomaly detection system. Finally, the work presents a network
forensic process for recreating control logic from encrypted programming traffic.
iv
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ANOMALY DETECTION AND ENCRYPTED PROGRAMMING FORENSICS
FOR AUTOMATION CONTROLLERS
I. Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Underpinning modern society are various infrastructures with processes and sys-
tems that ensure smooth operation. If these “assets, systems, and networks, whether
physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapaci-
tation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic
security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof” they are des-
ignated as Critical Infrastructure [1]. There are sixteen sectors designated by Pres-
idential Directive 21 [2] including such vital services such as the energy and water
sector. Many of these important sectors utilize Industrial Control System (ICS) which
includes Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed
Control System (DCS), or standalone Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) [3].
The resilience of these ICSs against a wide range of intrusions and adverse operating
conditions is paramount to the security of the society that relies on them.
1.2 Problem Statement
Originally intended as standalone and isolated systems, many ICS devices were
not designed with security in mind. Additionally while typical Information Technol-
ogy (IT) networks have been the focus of cybersecurity professionals, Operational
Technology (OT) networks languished, relying on security through obscurity rather
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than a robust set of security controls and processes. While IT networks benefit from
commodity hardware and ubiquitous protocols ICS has long relied on specialized
hardware and proprietary protocols that are long lived, ill documented, and difficult
to upgrade. Now as ICS is incorporating Internet Protocol (IP) solutions to improve
remote access and overall connection with corporate networks, the risk for adversarial
access has increased substantially [3].
The security of the system relies on overarching processes as well as the integrity
of individual devices. For this reason the U.S. has begun regulating from whom the
largely private owners of critical infrastructure procure their devices [4]. This fear of
a supply chain attack has recently been realized with the ongoing investigations into
the recent Solarwinds exploit [5]. This is the latest in a line of high profile attacks
against U.S. organizations such as the Russian targeting of the U.S energy sector in
2018 [6]. When a U.S. citizen reaches for the light switch, there is currently no doubt
in their mind that the lamp will turn on, but the resilience of this service may be
more precarious than perceived. Behind the power switch is a patchwork protection
and control devices. This research will examine the SEL-3505 Real Time Automation
Controller (RTAC), a flexible device representative of a family of power automation
controllers used in critical infrastructure sectors.
1.3 Research Objectives
The research objectives of this work are outlined below:
• Identify the operation and attack surfaces of Automation Controllers within
ICS.
• Explore available intrusion detection system (IDS) tools for Automation Con-
trollers and gaps for future development.
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• Develop a process for forensic artifact retrieval for Automation Controllers.
• Implement a data-collection framework for Anomaly Detection System (ADS)
experimentation.
• Evaluate potential ADS algorithms to detect network intrusions using collected
data.
• Assess the developed ADS, identify shortcomings and future improvements of
the application.
The questions to be answered by this research in order to meet the aforementioned
objectives are as follows:
• Are Industrial Automation Controllers secure?
• Can an ADS detect network intrusions using available device characteristics?
• Can application control logic be reconstructed by an attacker, without decrypt-
ing the encrypted programming traffic?
1.4 Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this research is that Industrial Automation Controllers are
vulnerable to some forms of network intrusions, such as Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks or ARP Spoofing. These intrusions can be detected by measuring the changes
in device characteristics caused by the intrusions. Additionally, illicit access to the
device using compromised credentials can be detected.
1.5 Approach
This research was conducted by first performing a penetration test on the target
device using both manual and automated tools. With a strong grasp of the strengths
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and limitations of the current security posture, recommendations are formed. These
findings informed the creation of the ADS. The ADS itself relies solely on the RTAC
itself and a Windows workstation capable of running python connected over a local
network. To perform some of the network intrusions, a third device is connected to
the network so that its Media Access Control (MAC) address can be resolved and
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing conducted. Python is used for both the
data collection and the data analysis with the utilization of various readily available
packages.
1.6 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis to the field of ICS cybersecurity include the fol-
lowing:
• Physical Vulnerability: Demonstrated straightforward compromise of end
devices through physical access.
• Forensic Process: Developed and demonstrated a network forensic process
for reconstructing control logic from encrypted programming traffic.
• Data Collection Tools: Created a series of scripts to ease the setup of a data
collection framework to test and evaluate an ADS against numerous network
intrusion and project scenarios.
• Qualitative Analysis: Presented strong evidence that Task Time can be used
to detect the additional burden on end devices caused by network intrusions.
1.7 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows:
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Chapter II introduces the ICS security and ADS concepts and nomenclature. The
NIST Cybersecurity Framework is discussed and its five functions are used to frame
the following sections. It defines the terminology utilized throughout this thesis as it
relates to an ADS. It provides an analysis of the device of interest for the research,
a SEL-3505 RTAC seeking to perform the Identify function of the NIST Framework.
The motivation for the included processes is discussed and related research is explored.
Chapter III focuses on the Protect function of the NIST framework. It demon-
strates the vulnerabilities of having physical access to a device and explains how an
attacker with physical access can do more than perform a DoS attack by bringing
the device offline. It provides several recommendations and best practices to mitigate
existing gaps in the ability to protect the RTAC
Chapter IV presents the creation of a forensic process for encrypted programming
traffic using the RTAC as a case study. It describes three different potential imple-
mentations to protect programming traffic while still allowing forensic auditing. This
process is part of the Respond function of the framework and is essential part of the
analysis of incident response.
Chapters V and VI build on existing security capabilities to bring a robust Detect
function to the RTAC. Chapter V begins by describing the developed ADS data
collection framework and establishing how candidate algorithms will be evaluated.
Chapter VI presents an analysis of the collected ADS data. It compares the
performance of several algorithms against the collected data set. It starts by using the
entire data set and then tests the efficacy of modifying the data set before providing
it to the algorithm. This includes exploring the effects of varying sample size as well
as the elimination of outliers by only providing certain percentiles to the algorithms.
Additionally, continuous evaluation vs discrete evaluation is compared.
Chapter VII concludes with a summary of the work presented and the contribu-
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tions to the field. In addition, recommendations for those utilizing similar tools or
frameworks are presented. Areas for future work are highlighted.
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II. Background and Related Work
2.1 Overview
This chapter provides background information and knowledge about Industrial
Control System (ICS) security including an overview of the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity framework. It then provides contextual
information about the SEL-3505 as well as its manufacturer Schweitzer Engineering
Laboratories. Finally, it provides related work subsections for both network forensic
processes and Anomaly Detection Systems (ADSs).
2.2 NIST Cybersecurity Framework
Cybersecurity frameworks provide a defined process to manage and mitigate cy-
bersecurity risk. The NIST framework was developed in accordance with the Cy-
bersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 to identify “a prioritized, flexible, repeatable,
performance based, and cost-effective approach, including information security mea-
sures and controls that may be voluntarily adopted by owners and operators of critical
infrastructure to help them identify, assess, and manage cyber risks” [7]. While tar-
geted at critical infrastructure, due to its flexibility, it can be employed in any sector.
The “Framework Core” consists of five cybersecurity functions, each of these is listed
below with the provided NIST definition [7]:
• Identify: “Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity
risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities.”
• Protect: “Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure deliv-
ery of critical infrastructure services.”
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• Detect: “Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the
occurrence of a cybersecurity event.”
• Respond: “Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action
regarding a detected cybersecurity event.”
• Recover: “Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans
for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due
to a cybersecurity event.”
Each of these core functions contains numerous categories and subcategories along
with informative references to help stakeholders achieve the outcomes associated with
each function.
Implementing the entirety is a process that can take a cross-functional team,
thousands of man hours, and hundreds of pages of documentation. This research does
not seek to apply the entirety of the process but ensure that an individual device has
the necessary functionality to be successfully integrated into a complete system. The
framework itself is a living document and its guidance constantly evolves. Moreover,
the application of the framework is a continuous process to ensure the system of
interest continues to be in compliance with the evolving threat landscape.
2.3 The Power System
The device of interest in this research is typically thought of in a power system
perspective. This section answers the question ‘What is a power system?’.
A power system is “a network of components designed to efficiently transmit and
distribute the energy produced by generators to the locations where it is used” [8].









There are two main failure modes of a power system, overloads and faults. Overloads
occur when a component is supplying more electrical power than it is rated to safely
handle. Most electrical components can temporarily handle an overload condition
giving operators some time to correct the issue [8]. Fault conditions occur when
power lines are shorted to ground or another line. As electrical current is equal to
the difference in voltage divided by resistance and a short has very low resistance,
faults must be cleared immediately to prevent damage caused by the large currents.
Opposed to failures which are caused by external factors, misoperations are “The
failure of a Composite Protection System to operate as intended for protection pur-
poses.” The North American Electric Reliability Corporation gives 6 categories for
misoperations [9]:
• Failure to Trip - During Fault
• Failure to Trip - Other Than Fault
• Slow Trip - During Fault
• Slow Trip - Other Than Fault
• Unnecessary Trip - During Fault
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• Unnecessary Trip - Other Than Fault
The leading cause of these misoperations in the power system is due to incorrect logic
on the protective relays [10]. However, misoperations could be caused by cyberat-
tacks. DoS attacks may prevent devices from taking necessary actions or compromised
devices may cause unnecessary trips. An example of a misoperation of a power system
is the Aurora attack in which researchers were able to cause severe physical damage
to an electric power generator [11].
Instead of looking at power systems as a whole, this research focuses on examining
a specific device and ensuring that tools exist to conduct all functions. This process
begins with the Identify function, understanding the devices in the network.
2.4 Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories’ RTAC
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL) is a United States based manufacturer
of power protection and automation equipment. As an employee owned company,
the number of devices they have sold and installed is not part of publicly available
information. However, viewing the success stories that the company publishes online
shows SEL devices protecting the power systems of the countries of Georgia and Grand
Cayman, controlling Microgrids at American Universities, mitigating arc-flashes for
North American Mining Companies, and managing the power for Oil Refineries [12].
Additionally, a Newton-Evans Research Company study of the worldwide Protective
Relay Marketplace has put SEL as the number one ranked relay in the North American
marketplace for the last decade [13]. Although an exact number is elusive, SEL devices
are clearly prevalent throughout critical infrastructures, including those of the United
States.
The device of interest for this research is the SEL-3505 RTAC. Marketed as a
substation controller, the RTAC combines physical I/O with flexible IEC-61331 logic
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along with numerous serial ports and dual Ethernet ports. In addition to its physical
capabilities SEL includes numerous communication libraries that allow the RTAC to
‘speak’ with countless devices. This allows the RTAC to be used as a data concentra-
tor, communicating with multiple legacy devices over serial protocols and converting
the data streams into Ethernet-based communication. This combination of features
makes the RTAC both a powerful tool for a system operator and a likely potential
target for network attackers as its compromise could cede control of all devices it
communicates with.
The RTAC consists of a embedded Linux host with several applications running
to act as a PLC. It runs a web server for configuration and management. From the
password protected web page, user accounts can be created and diagnostics can be
run. These diagnostics include checking logic status and performing factory resets
if necessary. The web interface uses a PostgreSQL backend that contains numerous
database functions. to download new control logic project files and make changes to
the device firewall.
Project files are created using a Windows-based engineering software called Ac-
SELerator RTAC. Control logic programming can be conducted in several of the
IEC-61131-3 programming languages including structured text and function block
diagrams. While undocumented, this software creates a compiled binary that is run
by a widely used PLC framework, CODESYS [14]. The CODESYS runtime is the
IEC-61331 logic engine and is what enables the Linux host to act as a generic PLC.
When viewed through the lens of the NIST Cybersecurity functions, the discovery
of these three key interfaces perform part of the Identify function. Understanding
the requirements of the web server, CODESYS runtime, and PostgreSQL database is
crucial to the security of the device and the network in which it resides. The omission
of the use of CODESYS in any RTAC documentation prevents product owners from
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fully understanding risks related to their devices.
The RTAC is designed with several robust security features. Among these features
are: an application whitelisting solution that “provides protection against rootkits”,
built-in Denial of Service (DoS) detection and system priority readjustment, and
functionality that allows all Sequence of Events configured data tags to be available
in a syslog client [15, 16]. While DoS detection is able to respond to brute force attacks
on the network stack and whitelisting prevents nonauthorized processes from running,
there is currently no detection strategy for the misuse or subtle exploitation of an
authorized application such as an unauthorized connection to the CODESYS runtime
or exploitation of the database. To fill the gap, this research proposes the addition
of an ADS for anomaly detection and a forensic process for encrypted programming
traffic. These processes could be employed across all generic PLCs providing end
device anomaly detection and incident response in any ICS network. The creation of
this ADS helps fulfill the Detect function of the framework and is explored in Chapter
V.
Additionally, the SEL-3505 has both an accelerometer and light sensor, these
features help detect intruders trying to gain physical access to the device. The dangers
of this are explored in Chapter III and recommendations therein help fulfill the Protect
function.
One category of the Respond function is Analysis. Within the category is the sub-
category, forensics. While the RTAC has secured its programming traffic by encrypt-
ing it, no current tool exists to recreate project files from the encrypted programming
traffic. If a device is rendered inoperable or is factory reset by an attacker or by
the system’s out-of-memory monitoring [15] there is no way to recover the offending
project file from the RTAC itself. Tools to reconstruct this logic are necessary for
both incident response and control logic auditing to ensure that the project being
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sent across the network is the same as the project present on the Engineering Work-
station. Chapter IV demonstrates a process developed for this purpose and to fulfill
the Respond function.
The Recovery function of the NIST framework is readily fulfilled by existing fea-
tures. The ability to factory reset the device from the web interface or from physical
jumpers provides sufficient capability as long as the device owner retains appropriate
archives of device settings such as IP address and the project file.
2.5 Related Work
This section presents work related to both the forensic process of Chapter IV and
the ADS design of Chapter V.
2.5.1 Forensic Tools
Performing forensic analysis on SCADA systems poses significant hurdles [17].
Due to the proprietary nature of ICS protocols, the development of reconstruction
tools is typically a manually intensive effort requiring intimate knowledge of either
the programming protocol itself for each device or the ability to reverse engineer
the binary format. Senthivel, Ahmed, and Roussev [18] reverse engineered the Pro-
grammable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) protocol used to program
Allen-Bradley’s Micrologix 1400 to build a tool called Cutter, which is capable of ex-
tracting a low-level representation of the control logic as well as a human readable
representation of some PLC configuration files from network traffic. Senthivel et al.
[19] then extended Cutter to produce Laddis. Laddis was capable of decompiling
the low-level control logic representation back into a high-level representation that
is human readable and programmatically modifiable. This allows for a newly coined
exploit, denial of engineering operations, in which engineering software is rendered
13
unresponsive due to a malformed network packet. With the creation of this tool, the
control logic that was sent over the network for one specific PLC could be recon-
structed.
While tools that can be used for singular devices are useful, a general tool that
can be applied to all devices has been the object of additional research. Keliris
and Maniatakos [20] built an extendable automated reverse engineering framework
called ICSREF. They then evaluated the framework against binaries compiled with
CODESYS v2.3, a development environment used for various manufacturers of PLCs.
Nochay (2019) provides a security analysis of the CODESYS runtime stating that the
official list specifies 350 devices that use CODESYS, with more being undocumented.
Instead of reverse engineering the compiled binaries, another approach to retrieve the
high-level representation is to utilize built-in decompilers of the proprietary engineer-
ing software. Qasim, Lopez, and Ahmed [21] followed this strategy in the creation
of Similo, a “Virtual PLC-framework”, that built a knowledge database of message
sent and received from engineering software in order use the engineering software to
recreate the high-level representations from network traffic. All of these tools can re-
construct their intended control logic for the current programming paradigm in which
the control logic is sent in plain text across the network. As ICS networks become
more secure, primarily by encrypting the network traffic, this paradigm will shift and
the reconstruction tools themselves or the process that archives network traffic will
need to adapt to handle this change. Chapter IV provides several implementation
alternatives and details the use of one of them to reconstruct the RTAC control logic.
2.5.2 Detection Systems for Industrial Controllers
One standard tool for detection in IT is an IDS. These systems monitor system
events to try and detect misuse or malicious activity [22]. There are two standard
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placements of an IDS, a Network-Based IDS and a Host-Based IDS. This placement
determines the type of data that the system can be used to detect intrusions [3].
Additionally an IDS can either be signature based or anomaly based. In a signature
based system the IDS attempts to match patterns of data such as network traffic
with a database of known attacks. In an anomaly based system it will seek to find
differences between the present behaviour and known behaviour [23]. This style of
system will be referred to as an ADS to differentiate it from a signature based system.
An anomaly-based approach was chosen for this research for its ability to detect
unknown attacks.
At an abstract level, a Host-Based Anomaly Detection System can be distilled into
a Workload, System Outputs, Tuning Parameters, and a decision strategy working
with a data collector at the heart of the ADS. Each of these individual facets are
examined to build a framework upon which to examine the experimental system.
Figure 1 shows an overview of the components of an ADS.
Figure 1. Notional Anomaly Detection System
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2.5.2.1 Workload
The workload encompasses the actions the underlying hardware must complete on
a continual basis. The hardware completing these actions causes measurable responses
that can be used for anomaly detection. Some of these actions are mandated by the
manufacturer and are both invisible to and unchangeable by the end user. Other
actions are created by the end user to fulfill their process needs. The final category
of workload includes the burden placed on the hardware by the physical process it is
measuring and the network traffic it is receiving.
• Operating System Functions
While programmable logic controllers and other industrial devices may be ide-
ally portrayed as user logic running on bare metal, in practice there is an operat-
ing system that is handling the network stack and the communication necessary
for programming the PLC. These tasks compete for resources and can cause the
PLC tasks be executed more slowly even as the real time requirements are being
met. Popular operating systems include OS-9, VxWorks, and Linux. Modifica-
tions to the OS, either malicious or manufacturer mandated, can cause changes
to the workload. Some of these changes have been shown to be detectable by
currently available ADS methods [24, 25].
• Control Logic
The control logic is the user created functions that the PLC must continuously
complete to successfully monitor and control its assigned process. The user pro-
vided control logic in complex processes can represent the bulk of the workload
for the industrial device. The detection of malicious modification to this logic
is the subject of numerous research endeavors [24, 25].
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• Network Traffic
The number of packets that are sent and received place a burden on the de-
vice. Some devices act as communication gateways connecting numerous devices
with a single upstream device. Others simply translate the physical process in-
formation into a digital representation that can be displayed from the central
HMI. Engineering functions such as programming, performing diagnostics, and
retrieving system logs can also place an additional workload on the device’s
resources. The effect of this workload can be seen in the task time of devices
under duress from network scans [26].
• Physical I/O
PLC’s and related devices are responsible for monitoring and controlling phys-
ical processes using specialized sensors and actuators. In some devices the
processing of this data has been shown to cause no increase in task time [24]
as inputs vary. This may be attributed to the handling of I/O possibly being
offloaded to a secondary processor. In the RTAC there is an FPGA that may
handle the data conditioning of the Binary and Analog I/O to prevent the CPU
from needing to intervene. Due to the limitations of monitoring the FPGA, the
effect of physical I/O variations will not be explored in this research.
• Network Intrusions
Network intrusions represent one set of anomalous actions that an ADS is trying
to detect. They place additional burden on the device by sending additional
network traffic, running additional processes on the underlying operating sys-
tem, or attempting to exfiltrate data. An ADS must discern between the normal




The system outputs from an ADS are the algorithm decision and confidence level
associated with the decision. To be able to compare the performance of two differ-
ent anomaly detection systems a common set of performance statistics needs to be
computed. Historically there have been four measures to indicate performance of an
ADS [24, 23].
• True Positive Rate (TPR): The rate at which the ADS correctly identifies an
anomaly.
• True Negative Rate (TNR): the rate at which the ADS correctly identifies a
normally behaving system.
• False Positive Rate (FPR): the rate at which the ADS incorrectly detects a
normally behaving system as an anomaly.
• False Negative Rate (FNR): the rate at which the ADS fails to identify a network
intrusion.
The False Positive Rate is the type I error of the system. If this rate is too, high
alarms become nuisances and will quickly be disregarded even when a true anomaly is
occurring. The False Negative Rate represents the frequency at which anomalies are
undetected. Keeping this rate low is the main objective of an ADS designer. While
these have been the historical measures for a system there are additional factors to
consider.
2.5.2.3 Detection Latency
Although not as frequently used as a measure of system performance the Detection
Latency is another important aspect of the system. It measures the length of time
18
required for the ADS to detect an anomaly. The infrequency of the inclusion of this
statistic can be attributed to the need for a more mature ADS than those typically
being explored in literature.
2.5.2.4 System Overhead
Industrial Devices are resource constrained and act in a hard real-time environ-
ment, therefore, a deployed ADS needs to be light-weight so as to not impact the
controlled process. This overhead can be measured as an increase in task time or the
increase in CPU burden percentage.
2.5.2.5 Tuning Parameters
Tuning parameters are properties of the ADS that can be changed in an attempt
to increase overall system performance.
• Selection of System Features to Collect
Depending on the user privileges of the ADS there are numerous available fea-
tures to consider. These include statistics such as task time, CPU burden, the
number of network packets sent and received, system RAM in use, and others.
Different features may lend themselves better to detecting specific attacks and
an ADS designer must carefully select, justify, and defend the chosen test statis-
tic. Previous research has used task time [24, 25]. This research seeks to extend
what intrusions can be discerned using the previously employed features.
• Data Collection Rate
How often data is collected can directly affect the sensitivity of an ADS. If
attacks are ephemeral, a polling rate that is too slow may miss the anomaly. If
data polling becomes too frequent, the burden on the device becomes too great
and the real-time requirements will not be met.
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• Number of Data Points Collected
The number of consecutive data points needed to make a decision in conjunc-
tion with the data collection rate determines the detection latency when the
processing time of the decision algorithm is neglected.
2.5.2.6 Decision Strategy
The decision strategy is the heart of the ADS and is paramount to the overall
success of the system. The decision strategy uses the collected data to make an
assessment on the operation of the underlying device. Various methods have been
employed in related research to detect anomalies. Depending on the data features
collected different strategies have been taken. Vargas et al. monitored RAM usage
using a Simple Moving Average [27]. Formby and Beyah used a Cumulative Sum
algorithm on task time to detect logic changes [25]. Dunlap et al. also looked at
task time but used the Permutation Test to discern changes [24]. Alves et al. used
a embedded machine learning IDS in conjunction with OpenPLC to detect network
anomalies by inspecting TCP headers [28]. In order to make a portable solution that
could be readily implemented in IEC-61131 logic this research focused on statistical
methods rather than machine learning.
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III. Protect: The Dangers of Physical Access
This section briefly provides an example of the importance of physical controls
preventing access to ICS devices as part of the Protect Function. Typical recommen-
dations for ICS security restrict physical access to devices through the use of locks,
card readers and guards [3]. These traditional methods work well when there is a large
amount of centralization in both logical control and device placement. However, the
SEL-3505 is not designed to be be deployed as a control center device. Its small form
factor, shown in Figure 3 and 2, and surface mount rather than rack mount design
allow it to be deployed in space-limited locations such as recloser enclosures, weather-
proof boxes that contain hardware for clearing momentary faults on distribution lines
that are placed throughout a power system. SEL markets this flexibility in location
for the power and even irrigation sectors [29, 30].
Figure 2. Back View of RTAC
This flexibility places these sensitive devices on power distribution poles through-
out a power system or in small remote enclosures and not just within the confines of
substations that have also been shown to be insecure [31]. This adds risks similar to
those seen in wind farm installations [32]. While physical access allows an attacker
to easily disrupt the functional control of devices downstream from the RTAC by
destroying the device or disconnecting power, more insidious attacks can occur if the
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Figure 3. Top View of RTAC
device is unknowingly compromised and remains on the network.
3.1 Disabling the Password
Located near the front of the RTAC lies a jumper block with five sets of pins that
can be connected by shunts or jumpers. Of the 5 pairs, two have documented uses [15].
Pair A can be used used to factory reset the RTAC by first powering off the device,
jumping the pair, and powering on the device. Pair C is used similarly but instead of
resetting the device, it simply disables the need for password authentication. It also
activates a default admin account so that even if all usernames have been forgotten
the device can be recovered. These functions act as conveniences for control engineers
and removes the need for network backdoors. However, the presence of these physical
bypasses for authentication in remote devices poses some risk.
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While the manufacturer recommends that the device be powered down before
connecting the password jumper pins, most likely to prevent electrical shorts while
performing the action, the password pin connection is tested continuously rather than
merely at startup. This can be verified by powering on the device with the top of its
case removed, accessing the web interface and monitoring the Sequence of Events as
the password jumper is added and removed. The password disabled state is logged
as a device level alarm by default. This gives a skilled and determined attacker the
ability disable the password and gain administrative access to the device. This in-
place intrusion avoids the difficulty of bringing the device offline, removing various
wiring and connections, removing the top cover, and then rewiring the device once
access had been gained and the top cover has been replaced. The ability to bypass
authentication of the device inplace greatly reduces to the time to exploit and may
decrease the ability for the system operator to send a response team. This places
both the data on the device and the process it controls at risk.
3.2 In-place Intrusion
To verify this possible attack vector, the intrusion tool shown in Figure 4 was
created using a bent paperclip.
Figure 4. Intrusion Tool
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It was then used to connect the password jumper with the top cover removed to
ensure that a proper connection could be made with such a rudimentary tool. Figure
5 demonstrates the placement of the simple hook stretching over the front of the
device and contacting the correct pins. The password disabled alarm was observed
each time the paperclip was placed across the pins.
Figure 5. Password Jumper Connected Using Paper Clip
As the paperclip was shown to be a viable candidate the top cover was replaced
and the RTAC was powered on. A flat-head screwdriver was used to pry the cover
away from the body of the RTAC and the tool was inserted and then rotated to
properly align it with the jumper pins. This action is depicted in Figure 6. These
steps allowed for the bypass of authentication without any power cycling or removal
of any wiring and the web interface was able to be accessed. This methodology might
also be applicable to other devices in the RTAC family such as the SEL-3530 and SEL-
3555 or a device that appears to share the same hardware platform, the SEL-3622
Security Gateway.
This method is not without fear of detection. A mistaken connection between
the grounded case and other conductive material on the circuit board can cause an
electrical short and cause the RTAC to restart for the safety of its hardware. This
reboot incurs a three and a half minute wait while the device powers up before the
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Figure 6. Connecting Password Jumper Without Opening RTAC
intrusion can be attempted again.
3.3 Abusing Administrator Access
Once the password has been disabled, the attacker has full admin privileges to the
device. This can be used to add/remove/modify device accounts. This can restrict
system owner access without performing a factory reset or password deactivation
of their own. Additionally, the control logic program could be retrieved, allowing
upstream data to be modified according to the attacker’s desire, to create control
system misoperations. Similarly, downstream commands could be interrupted, or
maliciously generated, to produce selective disruptions of service.
If the attacker was then able to elevate their PostgreSQL user to a superuser on
the database, specific database functions necessary to the correct operation of the
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RTAC could be modified or completely removed. If this superuser status was used to
run system level commands pivoting throughout the network using the RTAC may
be possible. These actions should be limited by the RTAC’s whitelisting solution but
some system level commands such as pinging hosts to try and map out the rest of
the network are allowed. The database superuser could also retrieve the list of all
users present on the device and the hash of their passwords, providing an additional
reconnaissance option to the attacker.
3.4 Recommendations
Physical protections are not always able to perfectly protect all devices, especially
those that are distributed in close proximity to the processes they control. To help
bolster the Protect function of the NIST Framework for the RTAC the following
recommendations are made:
• Deactivate the front USB port unless remote maintenance is being conducted.
• Deactivate any unused Ethernet ports
• Place a non-conductive cover over the jumper pins preventing a connection
being made without its removal.
• Ensure that all device level alarms are transmitted to a central monitoring
system including:
– Password Disabled Jumper Status
– Ambient Light Detection Levels
– Accelerometer Values
• Designate a physical input to act as a cabinet door contact sensor
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• Have a response plan in place to investigate any alarms in person to prevent
device compromise.
These recommendations help create overlapping security controls that cover both
Protect and Detect functions. Having a response plan that considers the compromise
of end devices such as the RTAC is valuable to the security of the overall system.
These plans are the heart of the Respond and Recover functions of the NIST Frame-
work. Another aspect of a strong response plan is having capable forensic tools to
help analyze anomalies, misoperations, and network intrusions and the subject of
Chapter IV.
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IV. Respond: RTAC Forensic Process
This chapter focuses on the creation of a new tool for the Respond function of the
NIST framework to replace presently available forensic processes that rely on insecure
and unprotected communication protocols to create forensic artifacts.
4.1 Securing Programming Traffic
When programming a PLC, the control logic is created in one of the five high-level
IEC-61131 programming languages. Once the control engineer has finished creating
the control logic, the proprietary engineering software acts to transform it into the
correct format for the target device. This end product is specific to the target device
but can include formats such as an executable binary format that controls the specified
PLC or a series of commands to modify the program stored in PLC memory. This
product is then sent to the PLC over an Ethernet network or a local interface such as
USB or serial located on the PLC. If this programming data is sent over the network,
the packets containing the binary can be used as a valuable forensic artifact [33].
The binaries can be reverse engineered to determine the high-level source code or the
programming commands can be decompiled with a tool such as Similo [21].
While useful as an artifact for Forensic investigators, a passive network intruder
could also use the network traffic as a reconnaissance tool, inspecting the program-
ming traffic to gain insight into the physical process the PLC controls and obtaining
further information on the PLCs communication configuration. If instead the actor
wanted to change the PLC control logic, they could intercept the packets as they tra-
versed the network and modify their contents before they reach the end device. This
interception and modification would be an example of a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attack as shown in Figure 7. It would also require the ability to reverse engineer
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the commands to understand the original intended logic. Another version of a con-
trol injection attack, Stuxnet attacked this programming chain on the Engineering
Workstation, modifying the programming logic during the compilation process before
it was sent over the network [34]. The ability to audit the programming logic and
compare it to what was created by the controls engineer is where the forensic artifact
derives its value.
Figure 7. Man-in-the-Middle Attack Modifying Programming Traffic
Network based MITM attacks are enabled by the use of protocols that send their
payloads in plaintext, which has been widely documented as a security vulnerability
in ICS protocols [35]. Even with this demonstrated need for payload protection,
the timing constraints in the process control, coupled with legacy hardware, make
applying encryption a non-trivial task [35]. In contrast, programming the devices
has no timing considerations, so encryption can and has been implemented on some
newer devices. Digital signing is a cryptographic method in which a private key is
used to “sign” the contents of a message. The signature is created by encrypting a
hash code of the message using the private key. Encrypting the hash instead of the
entire message is due to the relatively slow performance of asymmetric encryption.
Ideally this method achieves two security services. The integrity of the message is
ensured as the signature is based on its contents, and the identity of the message
sender is verified [36]. Digital signing is one alternative that allows for reconstruction
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tools to continue to function because the basic message is still sent in plain text
while the attached signature is generated from a hash of the message. Obviously, a
malicious network agent could also use these plain text messages to build knowledge
about the programming logic, making Digital Signing only a slightly more secure
method. Additionally, näıve implementations may simply distribute the private key
with the engineering software allowing an advanced threat to easily impersonate valid
programming traffic. Figure 8 shows the digital signing process for an individual
message sent between the Engineering Workstation and the PLC.
Figure 8. Digital Signatures Allows for the Validation of Network Messages
Asymmetric Cryptography uses a pair of keys, public and private, to encrypt and
decrypt messages that can be sent across a network. Created to solve the key distribu-
tion problems present in symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptography ensures
the integrity of the message and does not allow network intruders to inspect the con-
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tents of encrypted packets [36]. Figure 9 highlights the unavailability of encrypted
messages to an intruder on a sensitive network. Despite the encryption of the network
traffic, if correctly implemented, there are several ways to allow reconstruction tools
to have access to the data required to perform forensic analysis on the network traffic.
Figure 9. Asymmetric Encryption
One of the proposed approaches to solve the problem of decrypting the network
traffic is the use of a secure central database of private keys and the collection and
storage of network traffic between the engineering workstation and the end devices. In
this approach, when the network is commissioned and end devices receive their initial
configuration, the private key of the key pair for each end device is retained. Then,
when incident response is conducted, or for a routine audit, the private key vault is
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accessed to decrypt the stored network traffic. A notional diagram of this can be seen
in Figure 10. When a forensic investigator wants to inspect saved network traffic,
they retrieve the encrypted traffic and the private keys of the devices associated with
that session.
Figure 10. Private Key Database Implementation
In this approach, the security of the database storing the private keys is of utmost
importance in this process. If the device that stored the keys was connected to
the network and subsequently compromised, an attacker would gain access to the
network traffic that the encryption was intended to protect. Additionally, an attacker
with the private keys would be able to masquerade as one of the end devices of
their choosing, with potentially serious consequences. This implementation is only
successful for encryption techniques in which the shared secret can be determined from
external observation of the session handshake. Protocols that use methods such as the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange in which the key exchange is conducted over an assumed
insecure channel will be unencryptable by the auditing processes, despite access to the
private keys. These session-based protocols need a more involved decryption process.
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Another approach, perhaps more difficult to implement than the central private
key depository, would be a database containing each of the ephemeral session keys.
This implementation would require that at the conclusion of a secured session between
two devices, one of the devices would set up a secure connection with the central
repository in order to deposit the shared secret of the now completed sessions. These
session keys would be correlated with the network traffic based on the IP address,
TCP ports, and network time to allow for network forensics. Sending the shared secret
after the completion of the session would ensure the integrity and confidentiality of
the network traffic while it is active. Figure 11 shows the storage of all traffic in
an Encrypted Network Traffic Archive and the storage of session keys in a database.
When an investigator wants to see the contents of traffic they retrieve both the traffic
from the archive and the associated session key from the database. The security of
this session key repository would still be of great importance to prevent any network
traffic captured by malicious actors from being decrypted.
Another possible implementation would be to funnel network traffic of interest
that is encrypted through a proxy server that would act as a historian, as shown in
Figure 12. The proxy server would maintain two distinct encrypted network sessions,
one with Device A and one with Device B. The proxy server would decrypt the traffic
from device A, record the plain text network traffic, re-encrypt the network traffic, and
send it to device B. This would in effect be a sanctioned man-in-the-middle attack.
The traffic sent through the proxy server should be selected carefully as to avoid
adding delay to time sensitive messages and to not increase the amount of data being
archived to an undue amount. Any compromise to the proxy server could modify
the traffic while it is in plain text. The proxy server should also maintain a record
of its shared secrets for its encrypted sessions so that the upstream and downstream
encrypted traffic could be compared to ensure that no changes have been made to
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Figure 11. Session Key Database for Forensic Investigation
the payloads.
4.2 Network Forensic Process
The ability to recreate logic settings from network traffic is an important artifact
for incidence response and enables the auditing of control settings that are actually
sent to devices and not only what is present on the engineering workstation. When en-
crypted traffic is used to transport settings one of the previously explored approaches
needs to be implemented.
For the RTAC, the current capabilities built into the device allow for the preshared
private key paradigm to be employed. Figure 13 shows the necessary steps to perform
forensics on the RTAC programming process. From the web interface, an externally
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Figure 12. Proxy Server for Saving High Interest Traffic
generated private and public key pair can be uploaded to replace the self-signed
certificate. To perform this demonstration a new X.509 Certificate was generated
and uploaded to the RTAC. The private key was retained and added to Wireshark’s
RSA keys list for Transport Layer Security. Then Wireshark was used to capture the
network traffic on the Engineering Workstations ethernet interface as the engineering
software uploaded a new project file to the RTAC. At this point it can be shown
that Wireshark is able to decrypt the programming network traffic sent to port 5432.
Figure 14 shows the encrypted TLS segment data and Figure 15 shows the Decrypted
TLS Data with the PGSQL commands clearly in plain text.
Figure 13. Network Forensic Process for SEL RTAC
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Figure 14. Encrypted TLS Data
Figure 15. Decrypted TLS Data
With the network traffic decrypted, a reconstruction tool could then recreate the
programming logic that was sent to the device. An automated tool does not yet
exist for the RTAC so a manual reconstruction must be conducted. When the RTAC
is programmed, three files are sent: a compressed project archive containing the
CODESYS .project file, a .APP file containing the compiled executable code, and a
.CRC file containing a checksum for the .APP file. These files are sent by calling a
PGSQL function, load schema.write generic file, and then passing the byte contents
of the file. Figure 16 shows the beginning of a TLS payload in which a file is written.
The TLS segment data must then be decoded; it contains a mix of octal encoded
numerals, escaped special characters and some plaintext ascii characters. This was
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Figure 16. Create File PGSQL Function Call
achieved using the python code in Figure 17, which created the hex-encoded file
contents.
Figure 17. Python Decoding Script
Once the file has been reconstructed, the next step is to either perform a differ-
ential analysis between what was sent over the network and what was expected to be
sent, or to save it as a baseline file to detect any later changes. RTAC AcSELerator
does not provide the functionality to compare CODESYS .project files natively.
However, when the engineering software prepares to send the RTAC programming
logic it places the CODESYS .project file in an accessible temporary directory.
This file can be retrieved and opened in the CODESYS development environment to
use the provided compare function against the reconstructed file to find any differ-
ences in either logic or configuration. CODESYS can also be used to create the .APP
file from the retrieved .project file to find any differences to the compiled binaries
that were sent across the network.
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4.2.1 Forensic Process Results
This process was employed successfully against the programming of an SEL-
RTAC. Figure 11 shows the first several bytes of the encoded .project file that
was extracted from the network traffic. The entirety of the encoded file was decoded
with the python script to retrieve the sent .project. The header for this file is shown
in Figure 12. Note the first two bytes, “PK”, indicating that it is a zip file and the
plaintext “baseline.project” referring to the name of the application being run on the
RTAC. This reconstructed .project file was then successfully opened in CODESYS
to ensure that there was no corruption and compared against the original .project
file with no differences found.
Figure 18. Encoded .project File
Figure 19. Decoded .project File
This process is able to reconstruct any arbitrary project sent over the network
from the network traffic. This provides a valuable service to determine what logic
was present on the RTAC at a specific time. The RTAC does not maintain a history
of previous control logic, and there are no available reconstruction tools that were
designed to reconstruct encrypted control logic. This process could also supplement
the lack of subversion tools present on the engineering software. Subversion is an
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application that is used for maintaining historical versions of coding projects and
allows for changes to be documented and easily reverted. This process allows for the
data mining of stored network traffic to recover the project as sent even if the version
present on the engineering workstation has been updated.
4.3 Summary and Future Implementations
This chapter detailed the move from plaintext protocols to more secure encrypted
versions and the need to maintain the current capabilities to create forensic artifacts
for incident response. The described implementation of this process relies on the
use of TLS 1.1 to encrypt the PGSQL commands. If SEL moves to a more recent
implementation of TLS, it will employ session-based keys which cannot be calculated
from the TLS handshake. This will make network traffic unencryptable unless SEL
makes the ephemeral session keys that are typically only in RAM available for network
forensics. To make the traffic available for reconstruction, one of the more involved
decryption implementations would need to be pursued, either the proxy server or
the session key database. The proxy server implementation would mimic the Qasim,
Lopez and Ahmed’s Similo Virtual PLC-framework as it would act as an intermediary
to build the knowledge database but with the addition of encryption handling [21].
Forensic tools are used in response to detected anomalies and misoperations of ICS.
Detecting these anomalous activities for the RTAC is the subject area of Chapter V.
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V. Detect: Anomaly Detection System Design
Chapter II provided the general components of an ADS, this Chapter details the
specific implementation of an ADS and the related framework to collect the needed
data and test its performance. This system is created to supplement the existing
RTAC security features helping detect network intrusions without the addition of any
supplementary devices to existing installations. The goal of the system is to detect
intrusions before an attacker can cause misoperations or create persistent footholds.
5.1 Experimental Design
The data collection framework uses a combination of functions native to the RTAC
and supplementary functions implemented in python that could be integrated by the
manufacturer into the device’s firmware for future releases or implemented in the
logic engine by an operator. An experimental treatment or set of controlled factors
for each trial consisted of a firmware revision, a control logic file, and the use of a
specific network intrusion. Table 1 shows the possible factors. Selecting one factor
from each column for each treatment gives 24 different combinations. These variations
sought to capture the effectiveness of an ADS across varying workloads and various
intrusions. 10 trials were conducted for each experimental treatment leading to 240
total trials. The order in which each trial was conducted was selected by creating a
list of all trials and randomizing their order. This randomization was to reduce the
effect of uncontrollable environmental factors such as operating temperature or power
supply voltage. The devices were on a closed network so no outside network traffic
was present.
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Table 1. Experimental Factors
Firmware Project Type Network Intrusion
R145 Low Task Time Baseline





Previous research had shown that monitoring task times in PLCs can identify
modifications to firmware [24, 25]. To verify that this research can be generalized
to the RTAC, three firmware revisions released by SEL are used: R145, R146, and
R147.
5.1.1.2 RTAC Project Files
Two RTAC Project Files were used for the experiment. Project 1 was a limited
functionality project with an average task time of approximately 1300 microseconds.
It contained only the necessary logic for the RTAC operation with addition of a single
Modbus server for data collection. While the deployment of such a project is unlikely
to be done in an operational environment, as even a data concentrator would have
additional network connections and data mapping logic, this project provides the
lowest possible task time while still providing the necessary data for the ADS.
Project 2 is a much more complex project, designed for an average task time of
approximately 9000 microseconds. It achieves this long task time by performing
numerous complex mathematical operations that use both pseudo-random inputs
provided by the RTAC’s SELRand library and time varying inputs such as the number
of bytes sent and received by the ethernet ports. These two projects represent both
ends of the spectrum of possible project task times. Future work beyond the scope
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of this thesis will examine the use of branching projects whose complexity can vary
based on the current state of the process it is monitoring.
5.1.1.3 Network Intrusions
In order to assess the viability of using task time as a data feature for intrusion
detection, a variety of feasible network intrusions or attacks needed to be developed.
Hence, implementation details of the RTAC were carefully explored in order to under-
stand features that malicious attackers could exploit. Successful exploits would result
in arguably detectable footholds; detecting the footholds and the mechanisms that
create these footholds is the purpose of the ADS. The following intrusion mechanisms
were used in the experiment for their demonstrated viability as an attack vector or
as the manifestation of a created foothold.
• Baseline
The baseline treatment only uses the network traffic necessary to harvest the
ADS data. This provides an experimental backdrop from which to detect the
network intrusions. Repeated baseline trials are tested against each other to
determine the FPR for each algorithm.
• ARP Spoofing
ARP spoofing is a standard mechanism for the performance of MITM attacks
and extensively used in research to demonstrate the vulnerability of ICS de-
vices and networks [37, 38, 32, 39]. The exploit takes advantage of the lack of
authentication in the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) to send unsolicited
resolution responses containing false information about the topology of the net-
work. If undetected, this fake link layer information causes network traffic to
be misdirected to a network attacker.
Encrypted traffic severely limits an attacker’s ability to collect information or
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inject packets. Widely used industry protocols, however, still rely on legacy im-
plementations and are largely sent in plain text. This lack of security allows for
a range of modification attacks against widely used protocols such as Modbus
and DNP3 [37, 39]. The lack of encryption within the configuration protocols
of various devices also pose security risks to ICS networks in regards to ARP
spoofing [40, 19].
Improper configuration of the RTAC can also pose additional risks to ARP
spoofing. The RTAC generates a self-signed certificate upon the installation
of a new firmware revision. This certificate is used for encrypting the HTTPS
connection for initial configuration and for encrypting PostgreSQL traffic. If
this certificate is not replaced, an adversary could perform a MITM attack and
impersonate the RTAC using a previously compromised certificate. This would
allow an attacker to harvest credentials from the supposed secure connection
and inject arbitrary modifications into the system configuration or programming
traffic.
• PostgreSQL Queries
The RTAC uses a PostgreSQL database to manage the control logic on the
device and act as an interface with the underlying operating system. Engi-
neering functions are programmed as SQL queries that are callable from the
web interface. These functions include changing the Internet Protocol address,
testing network connectivity by pinging other devices, and reading system di-
agnostic information. As an open source database, PostgreSQL vulnerabilities
are typically discovered and patched relatively quickly as compared to PLC
manufacturer patching responses. However, there is still a burden placed on
the manufacturer to incorporate the most up-to-date database version in the
device firmware and for end users to patch their own devices.
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If the PostgreSQL database is exploited or database credentials are compro-
mised an attacker is free to perform DoS attacks, as the RTAC can be restarted
by a database query. A system restart is an easily detectable anomaly but sub-
tler attacks are also possible. The PostgreSQL queries employed for foothold
emulation during this experiment were reads of the control logic project from
the RTAC. The exfiltration of this control logic represents a major reconnais-
sance tool for an attacker as it provides in-depth knowledge of both the process
the RTAC is controlling and the various devices it is communicating with.
• CODESYS Connection
The codesys runtime application executing on the RTAC is responsible for the
industry protocol communication and the control logic operation. It has a
well known network port, 1217, that allows for various engineering functions.
These functions include uploading/downloading control logic programs, moni-
toring real-time logic values, forcing logic values for debugging purposes, and
stopping/starting the control logic execution. If enabled, the connection also
allows access to the device’s file system. Vulnerabilities related to the use of the
codesys runtime as a PLC framework have been previously documented [14] and
exploited for the decompilation of control logic [20]. While codesys has recently
implemented authentication features to create a connection with the runtime,
the RTAC has not activated this feature and does not require credentials on the
port itself. Instead, TCP connections to the port are blocked by default and
the port can be opened and closed by accessing the PostgreSQL database.
The file system access is a significant concern on the RTAC due to its use of
TLS 1.1 for PostgreSQL traffic and use as a web server for configuration. The
private server key that is used for encryption can be exfiltrated from the RTAC
using a codesys connection and then used to decrypt any communication and
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extract information such as username and password. Additionally, attackers
could insert or modify files on the device that may enable further exploitation.
To emulate this network intrusion, a passive codesys connection was active
during the data collection. This passive connection would be the minimum
workload generated by a codesys connection with no files being read from the
RTAC and no process values being changed from the engineering workstation.
5.1.2 Data Set Collection
For each trial, 30,000 task time samples were collected. This data was collected by
creating a modbus server on the RTAC and polling the server using a modbus client
implemented in python using the pymodbus module. After receiving a response from
the server, the client waited 1 ms before polling again. Task time was used as the
data feature due to its ability to detect logic and firmware changes, and sensitivity to
changes in network traffic as seen in previous research [25, 24, 26]. Each data set was
saved as a .csv file for future analysis using the selected decision methods. Figure 20
shows a notional data flow for the data collection process as well as the experimental
factors being tested. The steps for each trial are as follows:
1. Install the selected firmware version for the current trial.
2. Upload the selected RTAC project file to the device. This step ensures that the
correct firmware has been installed as each project file is firmware specific.
3. The data collection script is started, waiting 1 minute for the device to reach
steady state.
4. The associated network intrusion for the trial begins.
5. 30,000 data points are collected.
45
6. The data is saved in a .csv
The data as collected is then used as inputs for various tests to discriminate
between baseline trials and data sets containing network intrusions.
Figure 20. Experimental Data Collection System
5.1.3 Selecting a Discriminator
Pilot studies confirmed previous research indicating that the task time was not
normally distributed [24, 26]. Figure 21 shows a scatter plot of the sampled task
times from a pilot study with no network intrusions. There are three visually distinct
clusters in task time and no apparent correlation between when the sample is taken
and the associated task time. These three clusters can be seen in greater detail when
the data is viewed as the kernel density estimation plot that is shown in Figure 22.
Because the task time population is non-normal, three non-parametric statisti-
cal tests were chosen from literature. The efficacy of algorithms to detect network
intrusions from task time is then analyzed.
• Permutation Test
The permutation test is a re-sampling test that investigates the probability that
two sample populations are from the same distribution. This test can be done
without making assumptions about the distribution of the samples [41]. This
test has been used previously to detect logic and firmware changes [24]. To
perform this test the mlxtend python module was used [42].
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Figure 21. Scatter Plot of Task Time Distribution
Figure 22. Kernel Density Estimation of Task Time
• Mann-Whitney U Test
The Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric test that explores the null hy-
pothesis that one population is stochastically larger than the other [43, 44].
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While typically used in behavioral sciences, the Mann-Whitney has been em-
ployed to test for statistical differences in sampled and forecasted network traf-
fic [45, 46]. This test was conducted on the task time data in python using the
scipy.stats.mannwhitneyu function [47].
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (KS Test) is a non-parametric goodness-of-fit
test that probes the hypothesis that two independent samples are drawn from
the same distribution. This test has the advantage of considering the entirety of
a distribution function rather than just the difference in a test statistic. For this
test to be valid, the task time distribution is assumed to be continuous. The KS
Test statistic is the maximum absolute difference between the two distribution
functions [43] and was used by Formby and Beyah to detect logic changes [25].
For this work, the test was conducted in python using the scipy.stats.kstest
function [47].
Figure 23 shows the Kernel Density estimation for the combined data sets of all
trials for the high task time project with firmware rev 145. Visually, clear differences
can be seen in the number, height and location of the distribution peaks. Each of these
tests is an algorithmic way to try and detect these differences and other unperceived
differences.
5.1.4 System Evaluator
To test each discriminator, the data sets are separated by both firmware and
project type. This reduces the buoying effect of testing a low task time data set
against a high task time data set inflating the true positive rate. Then each intrusion-
free data set is tested against all other data sets in its firmware/project subset. Figure
24 shows the steps of the analysis process.
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Figure 23. Distribution Comparison of Combined Data Sets
The results of these tests are used to calculate the true positive and false positive
rate for each decision algorithm. This process can be repeated, varying the deci-
sion threshold to generate a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for each
algorithm. This curve helps explore the tradeoff between True and False positive
rates [24]. Additionally, the Area Under the Curve (AUC) can help compare the
performance of multiple classifiers [48].
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Figure 24. Experimental Analysis System
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VI. Analysis and Results
6.1 Overview
This chapter presents the observations, results, and analysis from the experimental
activities described in Chapters V. It focuses on the ability of the ADS to perform
the Detect Function of the NIST Framework.
6.1.1 Anomaly Detection Rates
The body of this section focuses on the compiled results from the 240 experimental
trials. First, ROC Curves were created for each of the decision algorithms, these
curves can be found in Figure 25. The area under each curve was calculated and is
displayed on the figures. The Mann-Whitney U test had the highest AUC with a
value of 0.89 with the KS test being slightly lower at 0.88, and the Permutation test
had a value of 0.80. An ideal classifier would have an AUC of 1.0. Using these curves
a decision threshold for each algorithm was selected to showcase their representative
performance. Each test having an area greater than that of the random guessing
line’s .5, lends credibility to the the claim that task time is a good data feature to
try and detect the network intrusions examined by this research.
Table 2 has the results of the permutation test, Table 4 has the results for the
KS test, and Table 3 has the results of the Mann-Whitney U Test. Values shown
in bold do not meet the desired performance threshold of less than 0.1 for the FPR
or greater than 0.9 for the combined TPR. The desired performance thresholds are
based on previous research in anomaly detection systems [24]. Each firmware-project
pair is shown to better understand if an algorithm did poorly overall or if specific
test cases were more difficult to detect. The Permutation test failed to meet any of




Figure 25. Algorithm ROC Curves
firmware/project pairs coming close but not meeting the 0.9 cutoff. The Mann-
Whitney U test did well on FPR overall but failed to have sufficient TPR in half of
the test cases. The KS test had a TPR of 1.0 across all test cases but struggled with
FPR, failing to meet the desired threshold in 4 of the 6 firmware/project pairs. The
strength of the KS test is an extremely promising result.
One Experimental treatment that may be a potential outlier in the data is Firmware
revision 146 with High Project Task time. The performance of all tests have markedly
different FPRs than the rest of the body of data. This could be due to some unknown
behaviour in the firmware version or in the automated conversion process for an RTAC
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Table 2. Permutation Test Results
Permutation Test: Decision Threshold 0.0001
Firmware Project Task Time FPR
TPR
Combined CODESYS ARP Spoof PostgreSQL
145 Low 0.46 0.94 0.96 0.86 0.99
146 Low 0.22 0.97 1 1 0.92
147 Low 0.40 0.873333 0.81 0.91 0.9
145 High 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
146 High 0.69 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.85
147 High 0.17 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.95
Table 3. Mann-Whitney U Test Results
Mann-Whitney U Test: Decision Threshold 1 ∗ 10−14
Firmware Project Task Time FPR
TPR
Combined CODESYS ARP Spoof PostgreSQL
145 Low 0.089 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.91
146 Low 0 0.96 1.00 0.90 0.99
147 Low 0.080 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
145 High 0 0.97 1.00 0.92 1.00
146 High 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.67
147 High 0 0.78 0.74 0.75 0.86
Table 4. KS Test Results
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test: Decision Threshold 1 ∗ 10−17
Firmware Project Task Time FPR
TPR
Combined CODESYS ARP Spoof PostgreSQL
145 Low 0.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
146 Low 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
147 Low 0.16 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
145 High 0.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
146 High 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
147 High 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AcSELerator project to be made compatible with a new firmware version. Figure 26
shows the ROC curves for each algorithm with this outlier’s data removed, boost-
ing the AUC of the KS test to 0.97 and the AUC of the Mann-Whitney U test to
0.94. The Permutation test showed a lesser improvement to 0.83. All further analysis




Figure 26. Algorithm ROC Curves Without Rev 146 Data
6.1.2 Testing Percentiles
While this analysis focused on testing the entire data set, previous research has
performed some treatments on the data before testing to improve the performance of
the system under test [24]. These data treatments seek to remove data points that
are either spurious or outliers by only testing regions of the data distribution. To
conduct this analysis each data set was sorted and then a range of percentiles was
used for the analysis each statistical test. The results of these tests can be seen Table
5. As showing the TPR and FPR for each experimental treatment would be come
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cumbersome for the number of percentile combinations used the results have been
reduced to just the overall AUC for each test combining all firmware versions and
project files results. The highest value for each test is shown in bold.
The best results stem from the tests in which the entire data set was used. This
high performance without removing alleged outliers supports the supposition that
the statistically detectable differences between the baseline and network intrusion
data sets lie in the extremes at either end of the distribution. Further bolstering this
hypothesis, there is a marked difference between the results of tests looking at the first
10% of the data set and the tests only looking at the data between the 2nd to 10th
percentile. Even as the upper bound increases there is actually a slight depression in
performance and then it buoys back up as the top percentiles are incorporated. This
analysis supports that the data set should not be treated before being fed into the
ADS decision algorithm. Modifying the percentile also changes the number of data
points being tested.The effect of varying sample size also needs to be analyzed.
6.1.3 Effect of Sample Size
A major contributor to detection latency is the amount of time it takes to collect
the representative sample. If the sample size can be reduced without having an
adverse effect on detection rates the ADS will be more responsive and be able to
better mitigate the effects of the intrusion. A device with an average task cycle time
of 10 ms and sampled every task cycle would take 5 minutes to collect 30000 samples.
If that task cycle time was instead 100 ms it would be 50 minutes for the same data
set size. Table 6 shows the results of varying sample size by only testing the first X
samples in each data set. Performance for each statistical test increases as sample
size grows until an inflection point is reached. For the Mann-Whitney U Test and
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test peak performance is reached with 8000 samples. The
55
Table 5. Effect of Varying Percentile Range on Area Under Curve
Percentile Tested AUC
Lower Bound Upper Bound Mann-Whitney KS Test Permutation
0 10 0.86 0.84 0.73
0 20 0.84 0.85 0.67
0 25 0.83 0.84 0.67
0 50 0.83 0.83 0.70
0 75 0.85 0.86 0.70
0 95 0.86 0.87 0.71
0 100 0.89 0.88 0.80
50 60 0.63 0.68 0.56
50 75 0.73 0.77 0.59
50 95 0.79 0.79 0.67
50 98 0.81 0.81 0.68
2 10 0.77 0.79 0.62
2 20 0.79 0.82 0.65
2 25 0.79 0.82 0.65
2 50 0.82 0.82 0.65
2 75 0.83 0.86 0.68
2 95 0.86 0.87 0.75
2 98 0.87 0.87 0.76
permutation test’s best AUC is reached with 16000 samples.
The decrease in performance as sample size gets too large may be attributable
to the test detecting minute differences in baseline data sets and causing the FPR
to rise while the TPR remains high. An example of this negative effect is seen in
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (KS Test) with both the 8000 and 16000 data sample
having a 1.0 TPR but the 8000 sample test has a FPR of 0.044 while the 16000 sample
test has an FPR of 0.11.
6.1.4 Performance of Continual Monitoring
In order to further reduce detection latency the discrete data sets could be aban-
doned for the use of a sliding window of data. This change in collection strategy
necessitates a change in decision strategy. Without the ability to amortize the cost
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Table 6. Effect of Sample Size on Area Under Curve
AUC
Sample Size Mann-Whitney KS Test Permutation
100 0.654 0.736 0.602
200 0.697 0.773 0.648
500 0.714 0.848 0.631
1000 0.770 0.904 0.659
2000 0.813 0.923 0.697
4000 0.874 0.937 0.758
8000 0.919 0.953 0.780
16000 0.912 0.924 0.829
28000 0.881 0.883 0.795
of each statistical test as data is collected the decision engine would quickly fall be-
hind. To perform such an evaluation scheme a more light weight algorithm is needed.
Example of these continuous monitoring schemes includes the cumulative sum or
CUSUM [49]. The CUSUM algorithm was used by Formby et al. for logic change
detection to great success being able to detect small logic changes within minutes
with zero false positives [25]. When the CUSUM is implemented it is assumed that
the distribution is normally distributed [50], this assumption does not hold true for
the collected RTAC data but the performance of the algorithm will still be explored.
The algorithm as described by Formby et al is shown in Algorithm 1.
This algorithm omits the allowance or slack value that is traditionally part of
the CUSUM algorithm [50]. This value typically is chosen to be halfway between
the target mean and the “out-of-control” value. Its omission causes the accumulated
error to slew much more rapidly as any difference from the mean causes a change
but allows for very minute, consistent changes to be detected. The ten baseline trials
for each firmware were used as inputs to the algorithm to generate firmware/project
pair unique thresholds to detect the network intrusions. Because these thresholds
were empirically derived from the baseline cases they allow for the quickest possi-
ble detection times without any false positives, possibly at the expense of the TPR.
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Algorithm 1 General Anomaly Detection Algorithm
1: procedure CUSUM . Cumulative Sum Algorithm [25]
2: Sn ← 0
3: Sp ← 0
4: m← population mean
5: Tn ← negative change threshold
6: Tp ← positive change threshold
7: while True do . Collect Samples Forever
8: x← new task time sample
9: Sn ← min(0, Sn + x−m)
10: Sp ← max(0, Sp + x−m)
11: if Sn ≤ Tn then
12: Negative Change Alarm
13: end if
14: if Sp ≥ Tp then




Table 7 shows the results of the CUSUM algorithm using the derived thresholds.
Each firmware/project pair performed extremely well detecting the network intru-
sions. The TPR for the high task time project on rev 146 was the lowest failing
to detect intrusions in 6 of the 30 data sets. The number of samples to the detec-
tion were quite high requiring on average over 14000 samples to reach the detection
threshold. Revision 145 with the high task time performed the best, detecting each
network intrusion and requiring only an average of 3732 samples to reach the detec-
tion threshold. This strong TPR coupled with its low detection time and lightweight
computational requirements make the CUSUM method an obvious choice for future
research.
6.1.5 Improving Detection Rates and Future Work
With both a compiled data set and a data collection framework in place further
discrimination strategies may be employed. The use of multi-dimensionality will add
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Table 7. Cumulative Sum Performance
Cumulative Sum Algorithm Results
Firmware Project Task Time Average Number of Samples To Detection TPR
145 Low 10577 0.97
146 Low 4035 1
147 Low 8069 0.9
145 High 3732 1
146 High 14230 0.8
147 High 7345 0.97
computational complexity and should be weighed against the added performance.
Additional continuous monitoring schemes can also be tested such as the Simple
Moving Average supported by Vargas et al. [27] or more advanced methods such as
the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average [50].
As candidate algorithms are vetted they should be implemented in the CODESYS
environment for deployment to the RTAC. By moving the detection from a central
system to the RTAC itself the burden of network traffic will be removed and the
potential for malicious tampering while the data is in transit will be reduced. This
will also allow for integration with preexisting capabilities such as syslog to allow for a
single point of security auditing for the RTAC. Additionally, with multiple detection
tests being implemented in discrete function blocks, voting schemes can be used and
tuned. The CUSUM algorithm may be the most promising as its implementation
could be rapidly placed on the RTAC has been previously used to detect logic and
firmware changes by Formby et al. and has been shown to rapidly detect the network
intrusions under test in this research.
6.2 Summary
This chapter discussed the experimental results of the created data collection
framework and selected detection tests. It provides strong evidence that task time
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can be used to detect network intrusions in addition to the logic and firmware
changes demonstrated by previous research. Both statistical and continuous mon-
itoring strategies were explored along with the effect of data treatments and varying
sample sizes. Future work will seek to build on these promising results placing the





This chapter summarizes the work performed for this research including a demon-
stration of physical access risks, the creation of a forensic process for encrypted pro-
gramming traffic, and the design of a data-collection framework for the development
and evaluation of an ADS. It reiterates contributions of the work and summarizes the
observations and analysis of the tested scenarios. Recommendations and future work
are also discussed.
7.2 Summary
This research focused on the cybersecurity of the SEL-3505 RTAC using the five
functions of the NIST Cybersecurity framework as a lens to inform necessary security
controllers. Its specific contributions to the fields are as follows:
• Physical Vulnerability: Demonstration of the ability to compromise end
devices when physical access is given.
• Forensic Process: A network forensic process for reconstructing control logic
from encrypted programming traffic was developed and demonstrated.
• Data Collection Tools: A series of scripts to ease the setup of a data collection
framework to test and evaluate an ADS against numerous network intrusion and
project scenarios.
• Qualitative Analysis: Strong evidence that Task Time can be used to detect
the additional burden on end devices caused by network intrusions.
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Chapter III highlighted the Protect function and detailed the shortcomings of
physical backdoors in remote devices. Several recommendations were made to help
mitigate the risks of inadequate physical protections and ensure a compromised device
does not remain on the network to create misoperations.
Chapter IV discussed the creation of a forensic process for encrypted programming
traffic and additional implementations to maintain present analytical capabilities as
ICS communications move away from plaintext and use more secure methods.
Chapters V and VI described the creation and evaluation of an ADS for an SEL-
3505 RTAC using task time as the data feature. It explored the ability to detect net-
work intrusions using this data by employing three separate statistical tests. While
used previously to detect logic and firmware changes, the Permutation test as pre-
sented was found to be unable to discriminate between normal variation in device
behavior and the burden created by network intrusions having an unacceptably high
FPR overall. The Mann-Whitney U Test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov show potential,
failing to meet the desired performance thresholds on only a few experimental treat-
ments. The KS test was able to detect the network intrusions in all trials and when
the performance associated with the Rev 146 High Task Time trials was removed,
the KS test had only 44 false positives out of 450 baseline to baseline comparisons,
a strong showing for a proof of concept test. A continuous monitoring scheme based
on the CUSUM was evaluated using the same collected data sets. With compara-
ble detection rates, lower computational requirements, and lower detection latency
the CUSUM is an extremely viable candidate to be employed in numerous system
scenarios.
The RTAC has several security features, but is not currently designed to detect
the feasible network intrusions that were tested in this research. ARP spoofing in
the absence of a network-based IDS will go undetected, and leaves the potential for
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damaging effects. While the ADS approach is not the only alternative, the use of
task time as a data feature for an ADS shows significant promise to be able to detect
network intrusions. This system can be implemented on existing installations without
the addition of any new devices by being deployed in PLC function blocks. In systems
were a network based IDS already exists the host based IDS can be use as part of a
defense-in-depth strategy providing overlapping security controls.
7.3 Future Work
Further research should be conducted to help find vulnerabilities and mitigations
for the RTAC and additional SEL protective equipment. Finding should be used
to examine devices that share the same hardware platform such as the SEL-3622
Security Gateway. The encapsulation of the intrusion detection algorithms and sub-
sequent deployment on the RTAC allows for further research against different classes
of intrusions such as processes that are able to bypass the white listing solution or
the unauthorized access of modbus servers.
7.4 Conclusion
Individual devices should not be below the examination of security professionals.
Dispelling the obscurity of devices that underpin the Critical Infrastructure of our
nation should be championed. Critical Infrastructure will continue to be a target
for our adversaries and we must rise to the occasion to ensure the prosperity of our
country.
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Appendix A. RTAC Firmware Update Batch Script
1 @ECHO OFF
2
3 Echo Start: %date% %time%




8 ECHO logging into database: %date% %time%
9 acrtaccmd login DatabaseUser -p Password
10
11 REM Unlocking the project ensures that it is able to send the
project
12 acrtaccmd unlock TaskTimer_Complex_R146
13
14 ECHO Upgrading Firmware: %date% %time%
15 acrtaccmd upgradefirmware -p Password 192.168.2.2 RTACuser C:\
XXXX\XXXXX\XXXXX\XXXX\SEL -3505-3-R146 -V0 -Z000002 -D20200224.
upg
16
17 ECHO Connecting: %date% %time%
18 acrtaccmd connect 192.168.2.2 RTACuser -p RTACPassword -n
TaskTimer_Complex_R146 -s
19






25 ECHO Starting Data Collection: %date% %time%
26 REM Launch the data collection script passing in the
neccessary naming arguement
27 python DataCollection.py %1
28 ECHO Finished: %date% %time%
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Appendix B. Data Collection Python Script
1 from pymodbus.client.sync import ModbusTcpClient as MC
2 import pandas as pd
3 import time




8 #Parse out the sent arguements
9 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser ()




13 #Create a data frame to store the collected data
14 df = pd.DataFrame(columns =[’received ’, ’transmitted ’, ’
ports_active ’, ’connections ’, ’bytes_received ’, ’bytes_sent
’, ’average ’, ’cpu burden ’, ’cpu burden average ’, ’system
time’])
15
16 #Wait 60 seconds for device to reach steady state
17 time.sleep (60)
18
19 for i in range (0 ,30000):
20 try :
21 #Connect to Modbus Server
22 client = MC(’192.168.2.2 ’)
23 #Read Input Registers From Server




28 #Bit shift modbus registers to be proper magnitude
29 received = (result.getRegister (0) << 16) + result.
getRegister (1)
30 transmitted = (result.getRegister (2) << 16) + result.
getRegister (3)
31 ports_active = (result.getRegister (4) << 16) + result.
getRegister (5)
32 connections = (result.getRegister (6) << 16) + result.
getRegister (7)
33 bytes_received = (result.getRegister (8) << 16) +
result.getRegister (9)
34 bytes_sent = (result.getRegister (10) << 16) + result.
getRegister (11)
35 last_tasktime = (result.getRegister (12) << 16) +
result.getRegister (13)
36 average_tasktime = (result.getRegister (14) << 16) +
result.getRegister (15)
37 memory_in_use = (result.getRegister (16) << 16) +
result.getRegister (17)
38 flash_used = (result.getRegister (18) << 16) + result.
getRegister (19)
39 cpuburden = (result.getRegister (20) << 16) + result.
getRegister (21)




42 #Add Data to Data Frame
43 d = {’received ’ : received , ’transmitted ’ :
transmitted , ’ports_active ’ : ports_active , \
44 ’connections ’ : connections , ’bytes_received ’ :
bytes_received , ’bytes_sent ’ : bytes_sent , \
45 ’last tasktime ’ : last_tasktime , ’average ’ :
average_tasktime , ’memory in use’ :
memory_in_use ,\
46 ’flash in use’ : flash_used , ’cpu burden ’ :
cpuburden , ’cpu burden average ’ : cpuaverage ,
\
47 ’system time’ : datetime.now() }
48
49 df = df.append(d, ignore_index=True)
50
51 except:
52 #Error handling for network transmission errors
53 d ={’received ’ : -1, ’transmitted ’ : -1, ’ports_active
’ : -1, \
54 ’connections ’ : -1, ’bytes_received ’ : -1, ’
bytes_sent ’ : -1, \
55 ’last tasktime ’ : -1, ’average ’ : -1, ’memory in
use’ : -1,\
56 ’flash in use’ : -1, ’cpu burden ’ : -1, ’cpu
burden average ’ : -1, \
57 ’system time’ : datetime.now() }
58 print("No response")
59




64 #Create .csv with all of collected data using passed in trial
argument as file name
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